Thursday, June 4, 2009
"They Probably Won't Be Making a Lot of New Loans"
The Federal Reserve may not start lending against residential mortgage-backed securities under its Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, Federal Reserve Bank of New York President William Dudley indicated. . .
His comments add to signs that Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s Public-Private Investment Program to boost debt prices and rid banks of devalued assets to expand lending is stalling, after helping to spark a rally in stocks and bonds. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. yesterday delayed a test sale of bad loans held by U.S. banks that had been billed as a tryout for its role. . .
“We still need more” than the capital that banks have raised to revive commercial-mortgage lending, Russ Appel, a managing director at Praedium Group LLC, a New York-based real- estate-investment firm, said during the conference. “Until they start clearing the old loans, they probably won’t be making a lot of new loans.”
After the apparent demise of the PPIP-FDIC program for loans, banks will probably try to mainly off-load commercial mortgages that investors would be “fools” to take on, because the debt would be more troubled than it seems, said Barry Sternlicht, chief executive officer of Starwood Capital Group Global, LLC, a real-estate investor in Greenwich, Connecticut.
“The only things they’re going to try to sell is stuff you probably shouldn’t buy,” Sternlicht said, speaking on the same panel as Appel.
DoctoRx here. Mr. Appel got it both right and wrong. Yes, they probably won't make a lot of new loans. That much he got right. What he got very wrong was that his business prospers when new loans are made. Whether they are good loans doesn't matter to him. The last thing this country needs is new investment in commercial real estate!
The article goes on to prove the point made at EBR over and over. The point is that the entirety of the machinations have been a giant pump 'n dump scheme to push security prices up:
The TALF and PPIP plans contributed to a rally among many types of home-loan bonds. Typical prices for the most-senior prime-jumbo securities jumped to about 83 cents on the dollar on May 14, from about 63 cents March 19, before steadying, according to Barclays Capital. Similar bonds backed by Alt-A loans with a few years of fixed rates rose to 45 cents, from 35 cents, according to the bank’s reports.
Case closed, in my humble opinion.
Please stay away from Big Finance as much as possible for the next economic cycle; and consider making a political statement by doing your banking with the good guys, the small community banks that have been penalized by the authorities, who overtly favor the continued formation of a financial oligarchy.
Copyright (C) Long Lake LLC 2009
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
Human Sacrifice Before the Altar of Big Finance
On Jan. 6, I posted Land of the Setting Sun, which began: "We are Japan."
Matters are going from bad to worse regarding the cause of the current economic problems, Big Finance. Please stick with this post, which grew from a planned brief one into something longer, due to breaking news.
Along that unfortunate theme of chronic depression or near-depression in real estate and other markets, yesterday I posted, Everybody Knows That Housing is Bottoming, Right? Today (Tuesday) there is some new commentary and news worth reviewing. First, the Case-Shiller house price data for March came out, per Calculated Risk:
The Composite 20 index is off 31.4% from the peak, and off 2.2% in March.
Prices are still falling and will probably decline for some time. The second graph shows the Year over year change in both indices. (Emph. added. CR is superb on real estate; what he predicts quite generally happens.)
The Composite 10 is off 18.6% over the last year.
The Composite 20 is off 18.7% over the last year.
OK, so this is "backward looking". Let's look forward toward the coming housing and economic recovery, which the global stock markets are ebulliently doing, per the San Francisco Examiner, also courtesy of CR: Signs of more trouble ahead for housing market. Excerpts include:
Warren Buffett and Alan Greenspan say the housing market is near bottom.
Peppy real estate agents and gloomy stock-market traders alike eagerly embrace that supposition. Wall Street is so hungry for good news that stocks rallied at the barest hint of upbeat indicators several times this month.
But an array of serious pending issues undercuts the turnaround theorists. . .
Here is a rundown of key problems that could continue to undercut real estate.
Demand still softens
-- Rising unemployment.
- - No "move-up" buyers.
-- Tight credit. (Ed.: Actually, back to normal old-fashioned credit, such as requiring 20% down. In the Great Depression, 50% down was standard, and cash purchases were common.)
-- Homes still overpriced.
Supply likely to surge
-- Foreclosure moratoriums end.
-- Shadow inventory.
-- Walk-away underwater homeowners. (This section is a "must-read". The couple referenced may elicit mixed reactions in you.)
-- Loan modification shortfalls.
-- Option ARM, Alt-A time bombs.
-- High end taking a hit. "The mid- to upper-end housing market is sitting on the exact precipice that the lower-end market was sitting on in early 2008 . . ."
OK. The article is worth a read, but who can stand more and more of the same old bad stuff. Time for good banking news, per Bloomberg: JPMorgan’s WaMu Windfall Turns Bad Loans Into Income.
JPMorgan Chase & Co. stands to reap a $29 billion windfall thanks to an accounting rule that lets the second-biggest U.S. bank transform bad loans it purchased from Washington Mutual Inc. into income. . . (Emph. added)
“It (the accounting rule) will benefit these guys (many banks) dramatically,” Willens said. “There’s a great chance they’ll be able to record very substantial gains going forward.”
The discounted assets purchased by JPMorgan and Wells Fargo make the stocks more attractive because they will spur an acceleration in profit growth, said Chris Armbruster, an analyst at Al Frank Asset Management Inc. in Laguna Beach, California.
“There’s definitely going to be some marks that were taken that were too extreme,” said Armbruster, whose firm oversees about $375 million. “It gives them a huge cushion or buffer to smooth out earnings.”
Let's translate. Banks that went bust, more or less, were taken over by politically-favored bank holding companies (BHCs). These BHCs were bailed out and are scheduled to have all the bad assets they want removed from their possession at unrealistically high prices with more massive taxpayer subsidies (via PPIP, see below). Now in a cynical sleight of hand, these same politically favored BHCs are scheduled to meet Wall Street's demanding standards for "acceleration in profit growth" or less demanding standards to "smooth out" alleged earnings simply because they undervalued the assets they purchased. NO economic earnings will have been created via this "accounting rule".
Like magic, the same guys who caused this global disaster are going to be able to pretend to be managers of growth stocks. Yet in the real world, there is no real recovery in residential housing, and commercial real estate, which is typically a late-cycle actor, is imploding, with NYC sublets down up to 67%.
Even at this hour, the news is coming fast and furious. Once again courtesy of CR, I see while writing this that the WSJ is reporting: Banks Aiming to Play Both Sides of Coin:
... Banking trade groups are lobbying the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. for permission to bid on the same assets that the banks would put up for sale as part of the government's Public Private Investment Program....
The lobbying push is aimed at the Legacy Loans Program, which will use about half of the government's overall PPIP infusion to facilitate the sale of whole loans such as residential and commercial mortgages.Federal officials haven't specified whether banks will be allowed to both buy and sell loans ...
Some critics see the proposal as an example of banks trying to profit through financial engineering at taxpayer expense, because the government would subsidize the asset purchases...."
The notion of banks doing this is incongruent with the original purpose of the PPIP and wrought with major conflicts," said Thomas Priore, president of ICP Capital, a New York fixed-income investment firm overseeing about $16 billion in assets.
Mr. Priore is being polite. The entire purpose of PPIP was to corruptly recapitalize the banks using, inter alia, the fiction that hundreds of billions of dollars of inventory that they own as assets/capital are suddenly "illiquid" rather than the truth that these assets have lost vast amounts of value that the BHCs and Mr. Obama (like Mr. Bush before him) don't wish to admit. That the BHCs want in on both sides PPIP proves the fact that the financial community wins coming and going from PPIP. The taxpayer loses. Period. Abe Lincoln would turn over in his grave. Government of, by and for the bank holding companies.
This is beyond revolting. The idea that Barack Obama is a populist is absurd. For the banks to even lobby for this concept shows how in control they are. The President has surrounded himself with hedge fund types such as Larry Summers. Tim ("triumph of the will") Geithner is such an incompetent tool that the WaPo has dumped big time on him, and his staff has gone over his head to the White House.
The economy, and more than the economy, of the United States are being sacrificed upon the altar of Big Finance, using voodoo economics and the Big Lie technique. A bleeding country cries out for relief.
Copyright (C) Long Lake LLC 2009
Monday, May 18, 2009
Knives Coming Out for Geithner (and Obama Gets a Scrape) as PPIP Delay is Quietly Announced
Announced in early February, it (PPIP) may not launch until July, officials say.
Here are some of the specific criticisms, some of which are body blows:
But some of the officials also cite the Treasury's ad-hoc management, which is dominated by a small band of Geithner's counselors who coordinate rescue initiatives but lack formal authority to make decisions. Heavy involvement by the White House in Treasury affairs has further muddied the picture of who is responsible for key issues, the officials add.
I list this first because the second sentence above is an indirect but specific criticism of the Obama style of micromanagement. Comparison to Jimmy Carter is obvious. More on Geithner:
In March, Treasury officials clashed over a $15 billion initiative to use money from the federal bailout package to free up credit for small businesses. Geithner's counselors pressed to announce the program quickly, despite protests from the career staff members who said it would not work. Unable to raise the issue with Geithner himself, the staff members appealed directly to the White House but were rebuffed, according to sources familiar with the episode.
President Obama announced the program two months ago, and it is still struggling to get off the ground. Officials are looking to overhaul the proposal.
The Post goes on to criticize Geithner for micromanagement which is also ineffective:
And in the wake of the public firestorm over bonuses paid by American International Group, senior Treasury officials have been meeting several times a week all spring to review, one by one, the payments to the company's executives. But the time-consuming discussions have never resolved whether any of the executives should get paid.
Extraordinary. These guys are wasting their time reviewing individual bonuses- and not even making decisions?
More:
Still, some lawmakers and government officials said Geithner needs to be a stronger manager.
"No one knows how to get decisions made," said a senior government official familiar with the Treasury's inner workings.
The Post resumes the themes of White House micromanagement and related neutering of Geithner:
. . . the difference between the Treasury of former secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. and Geithner's has been stark. Under Paulson, the department nearly always made its own decisions. The Bush White House, nearing the end of its tenure, hardly intervened.
But now, even minor matters, such as Web site design or news releases, are reviewed by the White House. Staff members detailed from the National Economic Council, reporting directly to Obama senior economist Lawrence H. Summers, roam the Treasury building. Treasury staff members working on restructuring the nation's automakers took much of their direction from the NEC, sources said.
Serious stuff when some at least implicit if not explicit comments favoring Bush/Paulson over Obama/Geithner make it into a WaPo article.
The article finishes with devastating comments about Geithner:
"People think he's very, very smart, but he has not exerted a management presence yet," added a source familiar with the Treasury's inner workings.
"He has not exerted a management presence yet." Wow. Finally:
"He's being stretched in a thousand directions . . . but I don't know if that absolves him of responsibility for management."
Yesterday, the Post, which is an unofficial house organ of the Democratic Party, wrapped the Pak-ghanistan War in the Flag, as commented upon here in Economy Due to Suffer as War Drums Beat More Loudly. The op-ed referred to therein was clearly a message from the White House. So, largely, was this article. Timothy Geithner is in over his head. This article strongly suggests that the powers-that-be in the administration are dissatisfied with his managerial competence.
Will Mr. Geithner declare victory over the financial crisis and move on to a lucrative job in Big Finance?
Copyright (C) Long Lake LLC 2009
Saturday, April 25, 2009
New Research from the St. Louis Fed Appears to Add Academic Credibility to the Battle Against PPIP
Now the St. Louis Fed has come out with "A Simple Model of Trading and Pricing Risky Assets Under Ambiguity: Any Lessons for Policy-Makers?"
The abstract almost says it all from a policy standpoint:
The 2007-2008 financial crises (sic) has (or, "sic" the verb) made it painfully obvious that markets may quickly turn illiquid. Moreover, recent experience has taught us that distress and lack of active trading can jump “around” between seemingly unconnected parts of the financial system contributing to transforming isolated shocks into systemic panic attacks. We develop a simple two-period model populated by both standard expected utility maximizers and by ambiguity-averse investors that trade in the market for a risky asset. We show that, provided there is a sufficient amount of ambiguity, market break-downs where large portions of traders withdraw from trading are endogeneous and may be triggered by modest re-assessments of the range of possible scenarios on the performance of individual securities. Risk premia (spreads) increase with the proportion of traders in the market who are averse to ambiguity. When we analyze the effect of policy actions, we find that when a market has fallen into a state of impaired liquidity, bringing the market back to orderly functioning through a reduction in the amount of perceived ambiguity may cause further reductions in equilibrium prices. Finally, our model provides stark indications against the idea that policy makers may be able to “inflate” their way out of a financial crisis. (emphasis added)
Your humble blogger has slogged through the lengthy paper, skipping the equations that a non-economist finds more than a mite obscure. It would appear that the St. Louis Fed has two policy objectives, the more topical one taking dead aim at PPIP.
One of the most important set-ups in the paper involves the situation in which SEUs (subjective expected utility) maximizers own securities which become illiquid due to a financial crisis. AA's (ambiguity averse) then enter the market with government assurance against a worst-case scenario. The authors state (pp. 36-37) for example that:
The implication is that starting from situations of SEU-only participation, it will take large jumps in "mu"-min (=minimum projected return, I believe-though never specifically defined) for the equilibrium to be significantly affected; however, when this happens, one can also expect a detrimental effect on risky asset prices. Interestingly and realistically, as the fraction of AA investors "alpha" increases, the threshold level mu-min required for inducing participation reduces, since now each AA agent has to bear a lower amount of risk. This is relatively surprising; even though the policy action consists of ruling out the worst possible scenarios increasing mu-min, for an action of sufficient magnitude its eventual effect on equilibrium prices will be negative and the cost of enforcing a participation equilibrium will consist of a higher risk premium. This means that when a market has fallen into a state of disruption (a SEU-only equilibrium), bringing the market back to higher liquidity and orderly functioning through a reduction in the amount of perceived ambiguity may actually go through further reductions in equilibrium prices. (emphasis added)
Later on p. 37, the authors summarize the above:
As we have seen, when a market has already broken down in terms of participation, trying to affect the perceived uncertainty by increasing mu-min may actually depress prices and inflate risk premia, although this policy can eventually raise liquidity and induce full participation. (emphasis added)
The above appears to describe the current situation in which the largest holders of CDOs and the like are faced with an auction to sell to risk-averse buyers, with government intermediation. Lower prices for the securities are projected. That would appear to describe the Public-Private Investment Program to a PPIP!
Regarding the different problem of the Fed's expanded balance sheet and inflation risks, in addition to the strong language in the abstract, the paper specifically addresses inflation in section 5.5.3., which contains the following (page 40):
Once more, inflation as a policy tool seems ineffective or perverse because it may induce limited participation and depress equilibrium real asset prices. . .
Therefore low inflation has only virtues, leading to steady, widespread participation, steady liquidity, and (with high probability) even to higher risky asset prices in real terms. Therefore, it seems that a sensible policy-maker interested in supporting a well-functioning, non-segmented asset market ought to reduce inflation.
The heartland is making itself heard. Let us hope that being "from Missouri" means something to Team O and Gentle Ben.
Copyright (C) Long Lake LLC 2009
Wednesday, April 8, 2009
Everything Necessary
Sunday, April 5, 2009
Warren Commission Redux: Tim's Time Coming Close?
- James Doran in New York
- The Observer, Sunday 5 April 2009
Elizabeth Warren, chief watchdog of America's $700bn (£472bn) bank bailout plan, will this week call for the removal of top executives from Citigroup, AIG and other institutions that have received government funds in a damning report that will question the administration's approach to saving the financial system from collapse.
Warren, a Harvard law professor and chair of the congressional oversight committee monitoring the government's Troubled Asset Relief Program (Tarp), is also set to call for shareholders in those institutions to be "wiped out". "It is crucial for these things to happen," she said. "Japan tried to avoid them and just offered subsidy with little or no consequences for management or equity investors, and this is why Japan suffered a lost decade." She declined to give more detail but confirmed that she would refer to insurance group AIG, which has received $173bn in bailout money, and banking giant Citigroup, which has had $45bn in funds and more than $316bn of loan guarantees.
Warren also believes there are "dangers inherent" in the approach taken by treasury secretary Tim Geithner, who she says has offered "open-ended subsidies" to some of the world's biggest financial institutions without adequately weighing potential pitfalls. "We want to ensure that the treasury gives the public an alternative approach," she said, adding that she was worried that banks would not recover while they were being fed subsidies. "When are they going to say, enough?" she said.
She said she did not want to be too hard on Geithner but that he must address the issues in the report. "The very notion that anyone would infuse money into a financially troubled entity without demanding changes in management is preposterous."
The report will also look at how earlier crises were overcome - the Swedish and Japanese problems of the 1990s, the US savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and the 30s Depression. "Three things had to happen," Warren said. "Firstly, the banks must have confidence that the valuation of the troubled assets in question is accurate; then the management of the institutions receiving subsidies from the government must be replaced; and thirdly, the equity investors are always wiped out."
Friday, April 3, 2009
Yves Smith Says Team Obama Uses "Big Lie" Technique, and Other Unpleasantries of the Day
Wednesday, April 1, 2009
News Review
- The closely-watched quarterly Tankan survey (Japan business outlook), released in March, showed sentiment among Japan’s largest manufacturers fell to a record-low
- The BoJ index gauging sentiment among big manufacturers slid to minus-58, more than double the minus-24 in the previous quarterly survey
- This signaled companies are likely to cancel spending plans and cut more jobs, pushing the economy further into recession
- Development in Tankan survey is consistent with a sharp contraction in the Japanese economy driven mainly by weak exports and corporate capital expenditures
- Big manufacturers expect to slash their capital spending by 13.2% in the year to next March, a much bigger drop than the previous year’s 2.4%
- Tankan suggests GDP will contract sharply in Q1.
The investment community was already suspicious last week when Secretary Timothy Geithner unveiled his plan, announcing that Treasury would select four or five companies as "fund managers" to purchase toxic securities. Given that the whole idea is to create a liquid market for these assets, we'd have thought Treasury would encourage as many players as possible.
But the bigger shock was when Treasury released its application to become a fund manager, a main rule of which is that only firms that already have a minimum of $10 billion in toxic securities under management can apply. Few hedge funds, private equity players or sovereign wealth funds come near this number. The hurdle would bar many who specialize in the very distressed assets that the Obama Administration is trying to offload from banks. . .
"This is ugly," says Joshua Rosner, the managing director of Graham, Fisher & Co., an independent research firm. "As long as they are experienced, there is no rational reason for creating limitations on who becomes a bidder and manager of assets. It doesn't serve the public good, though it may serve those few large firms that appear to have a privileged relationship with Treasury."
We have no idea if Treasury is playing favorites, but it certainly doesn't look good. All the more so given that some of these big players may have consulted informally with the Obama Administration as it was writing the plan. Not to mention that the big asset management companies that are most likely to land plum fund-management jobs are also the ones that have been most vocally praising the Treasury plan. (Treasury declined to comment.)
None of this bodes well for the bank rescue.
Geithner’s remarks reflect the view of some analysts that the worst of the economic downturn may be past, even as some banks are likely to fail and unemployment is set to worsen. The Treasury chief said the main danger is that banks and investors take too little risk and refrain from betting on a recovery.
April 1 (Bloomberg) -- William White’s tussle with Alan Greenspan is spilling into their retirements as world leaders meet in London to try to prevent the next financial meltdown.
White challenged the former Federal Reserve chairman’s mantra that central bankers can’t effectively slow the causes of asset bubbles when he was chief economist at the Bank for International Settlements.
As heads of state gather for tomorrow’s Group of 20 summit, several former central bankers and regulators are advising them to advance the same arguments White has made for more than a decade: raise interest rates when credit expands too fast and force banks to build up cash cushions in fat times to use in lean years.
“We started worrying about this at the same time that Alan Greenspan started worrying about irrational exuberance” in 1996, said White, a Canadian who has remained in Basel, Switzerland, since retiring from the BIS in June. “The difference was he stopped worrying about it, or at least he stopped worrying about it publicly, and we didn’t.” . . .
Federal Plan to Aid Small Businesses Is Flawed, Lenders Say
Officials Call It a Work in Progress
Two weeks after President Obama announced a $15 billion initiative to spark lending for small businesses, every major provider of these kinds of loans says the plan will not work as designed.
The conditions attached to the program, which require these financial firms to surrender ownership stakes to the government and limit executive pay, are so off-putting that these companies say they will not participate.
Industry officials and congressional sources said these issues were raised with the administration before the small-business initiative was unveiled. Nonetheless, administration officials accelerated the announcement, moving quickly to show they were using financial rescue funds to aid not only big Wall Street firms but Main Street businesses as well, sources familiar with the matter said.
Administration officials acknowledge the initiative is not yet ready and say they are reworking the proposal.
On the day of the unveiling, Obama said: "We will immediately unfreeze the secondary market for SBA [Small Business Administration] loans and increase the liquidity of community banks."